The following passages are extracted from Ron Suskind's book The Price of Loyalty, which is based heavily on the recollections and memos of Paul O'Neill.
These passages describe a National Security Council meeting that
occurred on the tenth day of the new George W. Bush presidency. A meeting where
Iraq replaced the Arab-Israeli conflict as the top national security issue:
[page 70] On the afternoon of January 30th, ten days after his inauguration as the forty-third president, George W. Bush met with the principals of his National Security Council for the first time...
All assumed their seats around the table according to longstanding ritual: at the head, the President; to his left, the VP, then Powell, [Paul] O'Neill, and Condoleezza Rice at the far end; to the President's right, Rumsfeld, CIA directory George Tenet, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton...
[background on the Clinton administration's failed attempts to get a Mideast peace deal signed]
[Bush] "We're going to correct the imbalances of the previous administration on the Mideast conflict. We're going to tilt it back toward Israel. And we're going to be consistent.
"Clinton overreached, and it all fell apart. That's why we're in trouble," Bush said. "If the two sides don't want peace, there's no way we can force them."
Then the President halted. "Anybody here ever met [Ariel] Sharon?" After a moment Powell sort of raised his hand. Yes, he had.
"I'm not going to go by past reputations when it comes to Sharon," Bush said. "I'm going to take him at face value. We'll work on a relationship based on how things go."
He'd met Sharon briefly, Bush said, when they had flew over Israel in a helicopter on a visit in December 1998. "Just saw him that one time. We flew over the Palestinian camps," Bush said sourly, "Looked real bad down there. I don't see much we can do over there at this point. I think it's time to pull out of that situation."
And that was it, according to O'Neill and several other people in the room. The Arab-Israeli conflict was a mess, and the United States would disengage. The combatants would have to work it out on their own.
Powell said such a move might be hasty. He remarked on the violence on the West bank and Gaza and on its roots. He stressed that a pullback by the United States would unleash Sharon and the Israeli army: "The consequences of that could be dire," he said, "especially for the Palestinians."
Bush shrugged. "Maybe that's the best way to get things back in balance."
Powell seem startled.
"Sometimes a show of strength by one side can really clarify things," Bush said. He turned to Rice. "So, Condi, what are we going to talk about today? What's on the agenda?"
"How Iraq is destabilizing the region, Mr President," Rice said, in what several observers understood was a scripted exchange. She noted that Iraq might be the key to reshaping the entire region.
Rice said that CIA director Tenet would offer a briefing on the latest intelligence on Iraq. Tenet pulled out a long scroll, the size of an architectural blueprint, and flattened it on the table.
[the book continues with several paragraphs about discussion on options for Iraq]
The President said little. He just nodded, with the same flat, unquestioning demeanor O'Neill was familiar with. But a new direction having been set from the top, this policy change now guided the proceedings. The opening premise, that Saddam's regime was destabilizing the region, and the vivid possibility that he owned weapons of mass destruction--a grainy picture, perhaps misleading, but visceral--pushed analysis towards logistics: the need for better intelligence, for ways to tighten the net around the regime, for use of the U.S. military to support Iraqi insurgents in a coup.
A major shift in U.S. policy was underway. After more than thirty years of intense engagement--from Kissinger and Nixon to Clinton's last stand--America was washing it's hands of the conflict in Israel. Now we'd focus on Iraq.
[more meeting discussion about Iraq options]
[A page later, after the meeting, Paul O'Neill thinking over what happened]
Clearly there were many forces destabilizing the region, most particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict itself, which we were now abandoning. Who exactly, was pushing this foreign policy, and were they asking themselves hard questions about choices and consequences?
The meeting had seemed scripted. Rumsfeld had said little, Cheney nothing at all, though both men had long entertained the idea of overthrowing Saddam. Rice orchestrated, and Tenet had a presentation ready. Powell seemed surprised that we were abandoning the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and making Iraq the focal point. General Shelton appeared concerned. Was there already an "in" and an "out" group?